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ABSTRACT
The misuse of websites to serve exploit code to compromise
hosts on the Internet has increased drastically in the recent
years. With new methods like Fast- or Domain Fluxing the
attackers have found ways to generate thousands of links
leading to malicious webservers in a very short time. With
the help of the distributed blacklist solution we propose in
this paper we are able to quickly respond to new threats and
have the ability to involve different sources to collect infor-
mation about malicious websites. It is therefore possible to
protect networks from threats that they have not even been
targeted for yet, by sharing attack information globally.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Malicious Websites and Current Counter-
measures
With the increase of security in server based applications,
attackers have started to target client side applications, such
as the web browsers or document readers. As these applica-
tions are installed on almost every host they make a valu-
able target for an attacker. In order to get people to visit
specially prepared websites that exploit current web browser
vulnerabilities, links are advertised using email SPAM. Other
methods include blog comments, guestbook entries, twitter,
or messages distributed across social networks as done by
the Koobface worm [1].
One (still rather successful) solution to this problem is
aggressive filtering of email SPAM. But SPAM filters only
tackle the distribution of malicious URLs through email and
not the other distribution paths. The economic damage
caused by successful exploits has spawned new commercial
security services that offer URL blacklists, i.e., lists of URLs
that are classified as malicious [14]. Browsers, for example,
can be configured to automatically query these lists before
visiting a URL. This is the idea behind technologies such as
Google Safe Browsing [6], Microsoft SmartScreen [10] and
Web of Trust [15]. However, all these systems have prob-
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lems.
Google Safe Browsing [6] and Microsoft SmartScreen [10]
use a closed blacklist, i.e., the way in which their blacklist is
managed is rather intransparent which does not contribute
to security. In our view, a blacklisting service should be
transparent, i.e., the way in which the blacklist is built and
managed should be clearly documented and accepted by the
security community. An implication of transparency is that
the blacklist should be accurate, meaning that a URL ap-
pears on the list if and only if there is evidence that it is
malicious.
In contrast to the solutions by Google [6] and Microsoft [10]
the Web of Trust (WOT) [15] is rather transparent, based
(partly) on a community effort that relies on a public voting
system to determine if a certain website is to be considered
malicious. Any participating user can rate the sites visited
in different categories like trustworthiness, vendor reliabil-
ity, privacy, and child safety. A web browser plugin retrieves
the information about the websites while surfing the Inter-
net and displays the information to the user. While this
system has a rather high latency to flag a website as mali-
cious, it also relies on the fact that more honest users rate a
site than dishonest ones. Furthermore, all currently existing
solutions follow a centralized approach to manage the black-
list, which does not scale and makes the service vulnerable
to denial-of-service attacks.
The problems of current solutions are amplified by the
tremendous mass of links leading to exploit sites that are
distributed across the Internet. With techniques like Fast-
or Domain Fluxing [8] the attackers have great tools at hand
to facilitate the process of link generation. As a result, the
links to one malicious website, which are received at diverse
locations or sensors, may differ. Therefore, localized black-
list services and services that build upon majority voting
also have limitations. A blacklisting service should there-
fore be transparent, accurate and have a low latency.
1.2 Distributed Infrastructures: P2P
The straightforward solution to the requirement of low la-
tency is to use a distributed storage and retrieval infrastruc-
ture for the blacklisting service. In particular, peer-to-peer
(P2P) technology has proven to be able to serve millions
of users at a high speed. The worst case lookup time with
P2P protocols like Chord [13], Pastry [12], Kademlia [9], or
Tapestry [16] is O(logN), where N is the number of par-
ticipating nodes. More recent distributed hash table (DHT)
algorithms, like Kelips [7], or extensions like Beehive [11] can
achieve a lookup performance of O(1), thus, performance is-
sues are negligible. Another advantage of P2P technologies
is that the blacklist can also be maintained in a distributed
fashion, i.e., many users can contribute information in a scal-
able manner.
We are aware of other work that has used P2P techniques
to combat email SPAM. Berkes [3] developed the idea of a
P2P-based SPAM blocklist. The system can be queried by
email servers to filter out SPAM. Technically, the system
is implemented using CGI scripts on webservers that form
the distributed network. Clients can therefore use regular
HTTP requests to retrieve the blocklist entries. The DHT
entries contain IP addresses of hosts that are known to send
email SPAM. However, with the rise of SPAM botnets black-
listing IP addresses has become less effective.
Another distributed system to fight SPAM is proposed by
Brodsky et al. [4]. The prototype is called Trinity and uses
Chord as underlying P2P protocol. The main focus is on
SPAM generated by botnets. Again this service is meant
to be used by email servers, thus it is implemented as a
plugin to SpamAssassin. To the best of our knowledge, P2P
technologies have not yet been applied to the field of URL
blacklisting.
1.3 Contributions
We propose the concept of a globally distributed URL
blacklist service built on top of P2P technology. Every time
a client of a participating network wants to visit a website it
queries the nearest P2P node for information about the do-
main name of the website in question. The answer includes
all information about malicious pages hosted on this domain.















Figure 1: Basic design of the distributed blacklist service.
We explicitly allow different parties to contribute infor-
mation about malicious websites collected at their location.
We call nodes that contribute such information contributors.
This information can for example be collected using client
honeypots that constantly crawl the Internet or use links ex-
tracted from SPAM emails as input vector. Allowing many
parties to contribute information has many advantages, as
can be seen from the following example (illustrated in Fig-
ure 1). Consider two networks A and B. Both participate
in the distributed blacklist service, i.e., each network runs
a node that is connected to the P2P network. Addition-
ally, network A runs a client honeypot system, that visits
all URLs found in email SPAM at the local email server.
The result of each visit is sent to the local P2P node, which
in turn stores the information in the P2P network. The we-
bclients of each network query the blacklist service before
visiting any website. If both networks A and B are tar-
geted by the same SPAM campaign with links to malicious
webservers that are detected by the honeyclient system of
network A all hosts of network B are protected, even if the
SPAM filter mechanisms of network B fail.
Without sharing the security relevant information between
the networks, the protection of a single network is just as
strong as the security mechanisms installed in this network.
Of course, information should only be contributed by trust-
worthy sites that also should provide evidence of what they
detected. This evidence can be checked, for example, by
own client honeypots and can contribute to other forms of
trust management and (write) access control to the black-
list. Overall, the more institutions participate in the black-
list service the better is the overall protection for each user
querying the service.
The remainder of this paper gives more details of our ap-
proach:
• We present an overview of the design of our system in
Section 2.
• We explain the P2P protocol that forms the basis of
the distributed blacklisting service in Section 3.
• We describe how contributors store their information
in the blacklist and how consumers can access this in-
formation in Section 4.
• We argue that the system is secure by performing a
brief threat analysis in Section 5.
Since the system is still in development, we cannot provide
performance measurements or a detailed security analysis.
This will be provided in an extended version of this paper.
2. DESIGN
The globally distributed blacklist service has four main
components: (1) a protocol that allows interconnection of
several thousand nodes plus the ability to provide access to
stored information for millions of consumers, (2) an interface
for both contributors and consumers, (3) the possibility to
remove entries that have been expired, and (4) a method
to verify the source that originally provided the information
about a malicious website.
The first component is based on current P2P protocols like
Kademlia. As these protocols are developed for information
exchange between millions of hosts with low insertion times
and fast lookup performance they are an excellent choice for
this kind of task. However, from a security point of view a









Figure 2: Schematic overview of the different node types.
We chose to add the concept of different types of nodes.
Figure 2 illustrates the three basis node types and how they
are interconnected. The classical storage nodes are responsi-
ble to store the information about malicious websites. These
nodes make up the core P2P network and provide the infor-
mation for all other nodes using the blacklist service.
2.1 Data Organization
Besides a method for data insertion we also need an up-
date mechanism to add new data to an existing entry. All
entries in the blacklist are stored with the hashed top- and
second-level domain name of a website as the key. In the
following we refer to the combination of top- and second-
level domain as tsDom. Since more than just one page of a
particular domain can contain malicious content, each entry
may consist of a list of hashed subpages. For example, if we
want to visit sample.com/siteX/page1.html we query the
blacklist for the tsDom key generated from sample.com. In
return we receive a list of hashed subpages that were classi-
fied as malicious. We then check whether one of the received
entries matches the (hashed) subpage we are trying to visit
and act accordingly. If one of the contributors determines
that another website hosted at sample.com is malicious it
needs to perform an update to add this new subpage to the
list of existing ones. To avoid inconsistency, storage nodes
need to check whether they already have an entry for a par-
ticular tsDom key, which needs to be updated, or if a new
one needs to be created.
2.2 (Trusted) Contributors
Next to the storage nodes we need contributors, i.e., nodes
that are able and allowed to store information in the P2P
network. These nodes can be any kind of analysis system,
e.g. a client honeypot. The P2P protocol must therefore be
enhanced by an authentication mechanism. We chose stan-
dard public key cryptography for this task. Each network
that runs contributors is required to have a key that au-
thorizes the contributor nodes to perform store and update
operations on the blacklist service. We therefore rely on a
centralized trusted authority (CTA) that issues certificates
to trusted members of the set of contributors. The stor-
age nodes only accept signed data from contributors. To
identify valid contributors the trusted authority frequently
publishes a signed list of valid certificates across the P2P
network. Storage Nodes and Consumers can verify the pub-
lished list with the certificate of the central authority which
is integrated into the consumer software. See Section 5 for
details.
2.3 Consumers
Finally, we have the consumers, i.e., the nodes that repre-
sent users that surf the Internet. The most obvious imple-
mentation of consumers are plugins for common web browsers,
like Mozilla Firefox or Microsoft Internet Explorer. Any
end-user that wants to use the blacklist service needs to in-
stall such a plugin and configure it to use available storage
nodes. A different approach is to configure web proxies to
act as both storage nodes and consumers.
As consumers run on end-user computers they are the
most untrusted part in the whole blacklisting approach and
therefore are only allowed to query the blacklist. That means,
these nodes can neither store nor update data in the black-
list.
2.4 Expiry Mechanism
Most malicious websites are online for a rather short pe-
riod of time. To avoid the delivery of outdated data each
blacklist entry contains an expiry date. The storage nodes
need to iterate over all their stored entries autonomously
and remove the ones that have expired at least once a day.
Checking the expiry date of a blacklist entry can also occur
upon operations in which it is involved, like query or update
operations.
3. P2P PROTOCOL
For a prototype we propose the implementation of a pro-
tocol similar to Kademlia [9]. Each storage node is identified
by a unique identifier called nodeID and every entry that is
stored in the distributed hash table (DHT) requires a unique
key called objectKey. The nodeID is generated from the IP
address, the service port, and the MAC address of a storage
node by using a function f , for example SHA-1 (secure hash
algorithm 1):
nodeID = f(ipaddress||serviceport||macaddress).
The objectKey equates to the use of function g, e.g. SHA-
1, on the top- and second-level-domain name (tsDom) of a
URL that is to be blacklisted:
objectKey = g(tsDom).
<dht timestamp = ’2012/01/02’>
<entry objectKey = sha1(’sample.com’) timestamp = ’2012/01/02’>










Figure 3: Example DHT entry of the storage nodes
The DHT entries contain the following information: the
objectKey, a list of hashed URLs without the tsDom to-
gether with the signature of the honeypot that provided the
data, and an expiry date, as displayed in Figure 3. Since
all information contained in a DHT entry is hashed, we also
preserve privacy for any querying host, as it is not possible
without brute forcing to determine the complete website a
user is visiting.
The objectKey is also used to determine the storage nodes
that store the blacklist information for a certain tsDom. Just
as Kademlia we can determine the distance of the nodeID
and the objectKey and choose the n closest nodes that store
the data. The higher the value n, the more offline nodes
are tolerated by the system and the lower the lookup time.
There is a fundamental tradeoff between replication and re-
source consumption: the number of copies of a DHT entry
generally improves the lookup performance at the cost of
resources.
To spare resources and to consider that malicious web-
sites can turn benign again it is necessary to have an expiry
date (e.g. two days) for each blacklist entry stored in the
DHT. That way URLs that are only short lived are removed
rather quickly from the list. URLs with a longer lifetime
will eventually be advertised more often and therefore will
be inserted by contributors more than once. This results in
frequently advertised links to stay longer on the blacklist.
Another important aspect is storage node synchronisa-
tion. If a storage node is turned off , e.g. to update the
system, or loses connection for any reason, no updates to
stored blacklist entries can be received. Without synchro-
nisation consumers or other storage nodes querying infor-
mation from this storage node receive old data. In order to
handle synchronisation we favour the following solution: We
perform no synchronisation and make the consumers wait for
at least n replies in order to compensate n−1 storage nodes
with old information. Additionally, we make storage nodes
forget about all their stored data, and reestablish the data
over time. As data is stored at several storage nodes, at
least one, which received all recent updates will answer to
consumer queries. The low expiry date and the fact that ac-
tive malicious URLs are added as long as they are frequently
advertised, support this solution and allow the network to
resynchronise shortly.
To set up the initial P2P network we need at least one
running storage node, that others can use to join the net-
work. During the bootstrap process (the initial connection
to the network) participating nodes (storage nodes, con-
sumers, and contributors) exchange their knowledge about
neighbours, valid contributor certificates, and, in case of
storage nodes, DHT entries.
4. INTERFACES
4.1 Consumer Interface
The consumer interface on the client side is realized as
a plugin for the web browser. As all common browser ap-
plications support third party plugins this is the most easy,
secure, and comfortable way of allowing users to take advan-
tage of the blacklist service. Upon the start of the browser
the plugin connects to the P2P network using one of several
configured storage nodes. Note that a consumer that is con-
nected to a storage node does not become part of the P2P
network. Client computers are not reliable enough to serve
as storage nodes as they are offline rather often, which would
result in too much fluctuation of data in the P2P network.
Storage 








Figure 4: Sequence of a consumer fetching a blacklist entry.
The initial connection to the P2P network is called the
bootstrap process. During this process the plugin receives
information about other storage nodes and the signed list
of currently valid contributor certificates. The certificate
of the central trusted authority is also already contained in
the plugin to verify contributor certificates. To release the
initial storage nodes, consumers randomly choose from the
list of received ones for future connections.
Once connected the plugin sends a request to the blacklist
service for every URL that is visited. As plugins have full
access to the browser controls this can be easily achieved
without any additional user interaction. Upon request the
storage node either returns the DHT entry for the tsDom,
that no entry exists, or that a timeout occured. The ba-
sic sequence of a client fetching information for an URL is
displayed in Figure 4.
In the first case the plugin extracts the list of subpage
hashes and verifies if the URL that the user is trying to visit
is contained. Possible parameters within the subpage are
cropped before the hash calculation. Although the contrib-
utors visit URLs with parameters we crop this information
before creating a blacklist entry. We therefore consider a
subpage as malicious regardless of the parameters that are
provided. Together with the signature of the contributor we
can also verify that the data has not been tampered with.
If a website a user is trying to visit is blacklisted, the
plugin disables any active content to make it impossible to be
harmed by code normally executed on the malicious website.
Otherwise the website is loaded and presented to the user.
In the second case, where no DHT entry is found, the
website is loaded in a normal fashion.
For the third case (timeout), we suggest to act like the
website is blacklisted, otherwise the user might get a false
sense of security.
4.2 Contributor Interface
The contributor interface allows the submission of DHT
entries for the distributed blacklist. We propose the usage













Figure 5: Sequence of blacklist entry contribution.
Contributors connect – just like consumers – to a storage
node of the P2P network and follow the same bootstrap
procedure.
Whenever a malicious website is detected the information
is stored at the blacklist using the store command of the
P2P protocol. Figure 5 displays the basic sequence of black-
list entries being added to the DHT. We propose the use
of SPAMtraps to collect email SPAM at many different lo-
cations, to increase the diversity of received messages, and
extract all contained URLs. The extracted URLs serve as
input for so called Honeypot Farms, i.e. a network of client
honeypots running in parallel to investigate as much URLs
as possible.
In case a malicious URL is found the results are stored in




























Figure 6: (a) Malicious honeypot contributes false data.
(b) Malicious storage node withholds blacklist data.
From this point on the P2P protocol takes care of distribut-
ing the information in the network.
5. BRIEF SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section we discuss four attacks that aim at the
most valuable targets of the blacklist service. The care-
fully selected attacks cover the three main aspects of security
analysis, namely: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability
(CIA).
The first presented attack refers to an adversary that has
compromised a single (or few) contributor(s) and is able to
store false data in the blacklist, i.e. benign websites are
marked as being malicious. The motive of such an attacker
is to hinder users to visit popular public webservices, for ex-
ample Amazon.com, to blackmail the owner of that service.
The attack is similar to the classical denial of service attack
against websites. Figure 6a illustrates the described attack
scenario.
To defend against such adversaries, we introduce a public
key infrastructure (PKI) for the contributors. Every run-
ning contributor needs a certificate that is manually verified
and signed by a central trusted authority. We refer to this
authority as CTA in the following. This certificate must be
used to sign any data submitted to the blacklist service to
ensure non-disputibility. The central authority is therefore
involved in any new contributor joining the service and is
also responsible for the distribution of all valid certificates
in the P2P network. A list of all currently signed certifi-
cates is sent to m storage nodes known to the CTA. This
list contains a timestamp and is signed with the CTA’s pub-
lic key. The initial m storage nodes autonomously distribute
the list by sending it to all neighbouring nodes. As the list
is signed and the CTA’s signature can be verified, manip-
ulation is not possible. If a contributor submits blacklist
entries, the corresponding storage nodes check the signature
against the list of known signed certificates. In case it is
invalid, the submitted blacklist entry is dropped. On every
update of the signed certificate list storage nodes check their
DHT entries to remove entries that are no longer a valid. As
a result, it is not possible to contribute data without a valid
certificate and in case false data is found, the corresponding
contributor can be disabled by removing the corresponding
certificate from the CTA’s list.
Of course we cannot assure that all the storage nodes can
































Figure 7: (a) Attacker eavesdrops on connections to initiate
targeted attack. (b) A group of attackers performs a denial
of service attack on a storage node.
as we intended. Therefore, the consumers also need to have
access to the signed list of valid certificates. Everytime a
consumer performs the bootstrap process, the latest list of
valid certificates is received.
The consumer is therefore able to verify the data returned
from the blacklist and can ignore revoked entries without the
need to trust the storage nodes.
The attack depicted in Figure 6b describes an attacker
that controls one or many storage nodes. The attack can be
splitted into two cases: First, the attacker is able to with-
hold blacklist data from any consumer or storage node that
connects to the storage nodes under control of the adver-
sary (Sybil Attack). Second, an adversary controlling nodes
in the network can also refuse to relay any requests of adja-
cent nodes and thus cut off part of stored information from
the rest of the nodes (Eclipse Attack). The motive here is
to prevent certain websites from being listed as malicious.
Douceur [5] showed that in a publicly accessible P2P net-
work, the Sybil attack cannot be prevented, thus we can
only make it harder. As we do not allow storage nodes to
freely choose their nodeID, an adversary cannot assure to
be the only one controlling storage nodes that contain DHT
entries for certain domains. Thus, the bigger the P2P net-
work grows, the harder it is to perfom this attack. For the
case that a consumer connects to a storage node under con-
trol of an adversary, we propose the usage of multiple entry
points, that are obtained during the bootstrapping process.
However, the list of entry points can be forged by a mali-
cious storage node as well, thus we cannot completely defend
against this kind of attack.
For the second case, Baumgart and Mies [2] developed
an advanced form of the Kademlia protocol – S/Kademlia.
Their protocol uses parallel lookups over multiple disjoint
paths and therefore removes the possibility to disrupt the
network by cutting the link.
An Attacker that is able to eavesdrop on connections ei-
ther between a client and a storage node or between two
storage nodes at any point of the P2P network targets the
privacy of clients. The motive here is to determine the surf
behaviour of a victim to launch targeted attacks. As il-
lustrated in Figure 7a an attacker can learn what sites are
visited by a consumer regularly an try to compromise the
webserver in order to get hold of the consumer.
We mitigate this threat by hashing the tsDom and the
combination of subdomain and path, i.e. DHT entries do
not contain any clear text information about the URLs they
represent. As a result, an attacker can not easily determine
what websites a consumer visited. However, the hash for
prominent domains can be calculated in advance, so that
an attacker that eavesdrops between the consumer and a
storage node can gain insight knowledge on what top- and
second- level domains, i.e. google.com, are visited by the
consumer. For this kind of attack to work an attacker needs
fundamental access to the network infrastructure, which re-
sults in more easier ways to determine a consumers surf be-
haviour that would even reveal the complete URL.
Finally, we describe an attacker that performs denial of
service (DoS) against storage nodes of the distributed black-
list. In this case the motive is to take down some storage
nodes or the complete blacklist service in order to prevent
malicious sites from being listed. Depending on the size of
the P2P network and the replication factor n of stored data,
this attack is usually uneffective, as the network is designed
to tolerate the failure of a certain number of nodes. Fig-
ure 7b illustrates the case where several attackers perform
a denial of service attack on one of the storage nodes to en-
force a timeout to other nodes querying blacklist entries for
domains hosted at this node.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We described a distributed approach to share informa-
tion about malicious websites using current P2P technology.
The proposed setup consists of three participating parties,
namely: storage nodes, contributors, and consumers. The
data about malicious websites is stored by contributors in
the DHT and retrieved by the consumers prior to visiting
a website with the help of a browser plugin. The storage
nodes host the DHT and serve as entry points for the con-
sumers. To ensure security aspects, a central trusted entity
was introduced, that verifies the contributors. As each con-
tributor signs the data it contributes, consumers can verify
it upon retrieval. We presented four of the most threating
attacks and showed how to defend against them. However,
as with all security mechanisms, there exists no single fail-
safe solution, thus additional protection mechanisms are still
needed.
The main advantages of our proposed concept are: we
are able to share information regarding malicious websites
between different networks to improve the overall security
and we are much more resilient to attacks than traditional
client-server approaches. After all our concept is not limited
to blacklisting malicious websites, but can be extended to
other aspects of network security as well.
For future work we plan to implement a prototype system
in order to measure the effectiveness of our approach.
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